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LEGISLATION
INSURANCE APPLICATIONS AS EVIDENCE
Another example of legislative protection extended to an insured in his dealings
with insurance companies is contained in the recent amendment to Section 1421
(formerly Section 58)2 of the New York Insurance Law. It concerns life, health
and annuity insurance and provides that: "No application for the issuance of
any such policy or contract shall be admissable in evidence unless a true copy
of such application was attached to such policy when issued".
While early in the history of insurance it was the insurer who needed "pro-
tection", it soon became apparent that the insured also required a shield to guard
against overreaching by the insurer.3 The amendment in question is but another
step in the legislative path of protective statutory regulation which began in this
state as far back as 18860 The effect of this amendment is to prevent the
admission in evidence of any application for an insurance policy if a copy is not
attached to the policy in suit. Simple though this may seem, the amendment
has had a varied and interesting background.
1. N. I. Laws 1940, c. 94, § 142 (1), effective March 6, 1940.
2. N. Y. Laws 1906, c. 326, § 16: "Every policy of insurance isued or dslivered within
the state.. . by any life insurance corporation doing business within the state shall contain
the entire contract between the parties and nothing shall be incorporated therein by
reference to any constitution, by-laws, rules, application or other writings unlezs the same
are indorsed upon or attached to the policy when issued; and all statements purporting to
be made by the insured shall in the absence of fraud be deemed representations and not
warranties. Any waiver of the provisions of this section shall be void". Statutes regulating
insurance companies have been held constitutional. German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis,
233 U. S. 389 (1913).
3. Patterson, Administrative Control of Insurance Policy Forms (1925) 25 COL. L. Rzv.
253, 254. This attitude of "protecting the insured" is not limited to the qLislative sphere.
The policy of many courts is to resolve all doubt or uncertainty in the construction of an
insurance contract in favor of the insured. Smith v. 'Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 175 N. C. 314, '5
S. E. 562 (1918). But when the legislatures prescribed a "standard" form of insurance
contract the reason for the rule of construction failed and some courts thereafter refrained
from construing insurance policies against the insurer in cases of ambiguity. Gallopin v.
Continental Casualty Co., 290 Ill. App. 3, 7 N. E. (2d) 771 (1937); Solomon v. United
States Fire Ins. Co., 53 R. 1. 154, 165 At. 214 (1933). Nevertheless, some courts and
writers rejected this exception and held to the proposition that all douht was to be reco'vCd
in favor of the insured. Levinton v. Ohio Farmer's Ins. Co., 267 Pa. 443, 110 A. 295
(1920) ; RicHA.ns, Tisunaxpcn (4th ed. 1932) 115-116; VA=Cn, L;surnvacz (2d ed. 1930)
691-693. The reason for construing all doubt in favor of the insured, even under the
"standard" policy, is thus stated by Vance, supra: "It is also apparent from an examination of
the instruments themselves, as well as the history of their adoption, that their terms were
really chosen by the underwriters with particular reference to their own interests." See ako
O'Neil v. American Fire Ins. Co., 166 Pa. 72, 30 At. 943 (1895). For a comment on the
construction of statutory clauses in insurance policies see (1938) 72 U. S. L. REv. 361.
4. N. Y. Laws 1886, c. 483. The first state to standardize an insurance policy w:s
Massachusetts in 1873. For the different types of this "statutory regulation" and their
history see Patterson, supra note 3.
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Warranties and Representations
Prior to 1907, when Section 58 of the Insurance Law became effective, the
breach of a warranty,5 appearing in an application for insurance, was a good
defense to any claim upon the policy. This was so although the warranty
related to matters which were, in fact, immaterial.0 On the other hand, a mis-
representation7 contained in the application was good as a defense only if it
concerned a material matter,8 and only if it were found that the representation
was substantially untrue. The effect of Section 58, which required all state-
ments by the insured, in tke absence of fraud, to be deemed representations and
not warranties, was to abolish the harshness of the results which naturally fol-
lowed if a breach of warranty were found to exist.0 A breach of warranty of an
immaterial fact would not void the policy,'0 and of course a misrepresentation did
not do so unless it likewise concerned a material matter."1 A further step in
5. N. Y. INs. LAW (1939) § 150 (1) provides that a warranty is . . . any provision of
an insurance contract which has the effect of requiring, as a condition precedent of the taking
effect of such contract or as a condition precedent to the insurer's liability thereunder"
the existence or non-existence of a fact which tends to diminish or increase the risk of los.
See also VANCE, INsURANcE (2d ed. 1930) 384-386.
6. Donley v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 184 N. Y. 107, 76 N. E. 914 (1906); Gaines v.
Fidelity and Casualty Co., 188 N. Y. 411, 415, 81 N. E. 169, 170 (1907), ("It is a general
rule . . . that the materiality . . . is of no consequence"). See also Foot v. Aetna Life Ins,
Co., 61 N. Y. 571, 576 (1875); 1 MAY, INsuRANCE (4th ed. 1900) § 156. The same rule
was applied in other jurisdictions. Bennett v. Agr. Ins. Co., 50 Conn. 420 (1883).
7. N. Y. INs. LAw (1939) § 149 (1). A representation is a statement as to a past or
present fact made to the insurer by or by the authority of the applicant as an inducement
to making of such contract. A misrepresentation is a false representation. See VANCE,
INsURANcE. (2d ed. 1930) 359 to the effect that a representation is a statement made to give
information to the insurer and otherwise induce him to enter into the insurance contract.
8. See Donley v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 184 N. Y. 107, 113, 76 N. E. 914, 916 (1906). The
basis for such a distinction in result between a breach of warranty and a misrepresntation
was that a representation was merely collateral to the contract whereas a warranty, regard-
less of its materiality, was a part of the contract and had the force of a condition precedent.
Ibid. See also 1 MAY, INsuRANcE (4th ed. 1900) §§ 181, 184.
9. Kasprzyk v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 79 Misc. 263, 140 N. Y. Supp. 211 (Sup. Ct.
1913) ; E. D. P. Dye Works Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 234 N. Y. 441, 138 N. E. 401 (1923).
It will be noted that when the Insurance Law was recodified the phrase "in the absence of
fraud" was omitted from section 142.
10. Rakov v. Bankers' Life Ins. Co., 164 App. Div. 645, 150 N. Y. Supp. 55 (3d Dep't
1914). See concurring opinion of Smith, P. J., id. at 649, 150 N. Y. Stipp. at 58. "It
seems clear to me that the object intended to be accomplished by this legislation was to
protect the policyholder from the rule of law that had theretofore been held that a warranty
of an immaterial fact, if untrue, voided the policy."
11. E. D. P. Dye Works, Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 234 N. Y. 441, 138 N. E. 401 (1923);
Murphy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co., 83 Misc. 475, 145 N. Y. Supp. 196 (Sup. Ct. 1914),
modifIed, 163 App. Div. 875, 147 N. Y. Supp. 565 (lst Dep't 1914). See also Minsker v.
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 254 N. Y. 333, 338, 173 N. E. 4, 5 (1930), where the court
stated that "since the enactment of section 58, a statement by the insured, though incorporated
(Vol. 9
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"watching over the insured" was made when the recodification of the Insurance
Law, effective January, 1940, provided that Section 142 would apply not only
to life insurance but also to policies of accident and health insurance and to
contracts of annuity. s'-
The most important provision in Section 58, the predecessor of what is now
Section 142 of the Insurance Law, was the requirement that the policy was to
contain the entire contract and no application or extraneous writing was to he
incorporated therein by reference unless such other writing was attached to or
indorsed upon the policy when issued. It is this provision in Section 58 that
has sorely vexed the courts and the present amendment was adopted to "lift
the veil of confusion" enveloping the section.' 3
Protecting the Insured
Until Section 58 was adopted a contract of insurance could, by reference,
incorporate into itself the constitution, by-laws or rules of the insurer and any
writings or other instruments of the insured which the policy itself did not
contain,' 4 and which the insured had never seen or even knew to exist. These
references thus made a part of the contract, were held to be warranties,'0 the
breach of which avoided the policy.' 0 It is a matter of common knowledge that
the purchaser of insurance seldom reads the policy and application in its
entirety, either because he relies on the insurance agent to set out the facts
properly in the application' 7 or else because he cannot understand its detailed and
technical terms.ls The picture was well painted by Chief Justice Doe when
into the policy, will be interpreted as a representation rather than a warranty, at all events
in the absence of fraud, and so, even though erroneous, will not vitiate the policy smless
rzaterial to the risk" (Italics inserted).
12. IN. Y. L.AWs 1939, c. 882, § 142 (1) (3). Section 53 had formerly been held only to
apply to life insurance. Baumann v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co., 225 N. 1. 480, 122 N. E.
628 (1919).
13. N. Y. L. J., February 15, 1940, p. 716, col. 3, letter by Murray L. Watt, Associate
Counsel, Joint Legislative Committee for the Re-Codification of the Insurance Law.
14. Cushman v. United States Life Ins. Co., 63 N. Y. 404 (1875) (policy provided that the
application for insurance and the statements contained therein constituted part of the con-
tract); Clemans v. Supreme Assembly Royal Society of Good Fellows, 131 N. Y. 435, 30
N. E. 496 (1892) ; Gill v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 11 Ariz. 232, 95 Pac. 89 (1903).
15. Dilleber v. Home Life Ins. Co., 69 N. Y. 256, 25 Am. Rep. 182 (1877); Gaines v.
The Fidelity and Casualty Co., 188 N. Y. 411, 81 N. E. 169 (1907); Baker v Home Life
Ins. Co., 64 N. Y. 648 (1876). It was a matter of general knowledge, of legslative knowl-
edge and of judicial knowledge that all statements which are either warranties or reprEenta-
tions are contained alike, generally, in the paper designated the application.' Archer v.
Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 218 N. Y. 18, 23-24, 112 X. E. 433, 435 (1916).
16. See note 6, supra.
17. "Little used to business or business forms, it is quite easy to see that he may be
disposed to place almost entire credence in the statements made by the agent!' O'Farrell v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 22 App. Div. 495, 498, 43 N. Y. Supp. 199, 201 (2d Dcp't 1397).
See also Fitchner v. Fidelity Mut. Fire Ass'n, 103 Iowa 276, 72 N. W. 530 (1897).
18. "The contracts are ignorantly made and are only voluntarily entercd into hecauze
19401
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he said that numerous provisions inserted in the complicated policies and forms
of application " . . . were of such bulk and character that they would not be
understood by men in general .... -19 What often resulted when the beneficiary
attempted to collect the insurance was the interposition by the insurer as a
defense the breach of some warranty made by the insured in his application.
As was said by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, ".... an insurance company
would offer a by-law, or the application of the insured, in evidence, for the
purpose of impaling the plaintiff upon some technical point".20  More than
likely the insured, as a part of his contract, did not have a copy of the statements
he made in the application and he could not, by reading the policy, know what
the statements were. 21 The first important case to construe Section 58 pointed
out this evil, 22 and stated that in order to prevent any "hidden jokers" from
springing up to perplex the insured or his beneficiary, the historic Section 58
of the Insurance Law was enacted.
Following the enactment of Section 58, it was repeatedly held that the
legislature intended that the policy should physically contain the entire contract.
All of the statements constituting the contract were to be placed ". . . through
the delivery of the policy, in the possession of and be and remain accessible to
the insured. . . . Therefore, all those statements, which are on their face
warranties, must be incorporated in the policy, either directly or by indorse-
ment or attachment, or be abandoned as warranties". 23 Henceforth, "the
defense that the insured made false statements inducing the issuance of the
policy ceased to constitute a valid defense" 24 unless those statements were
attached to the policy.
not understood". O'Farrell v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 22 App. Div. 495, 499, 48 N. Y.
Supp. 199, 202 (2d Dep't 1897). (Italics inserted). In Abbott v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
America, 281 N. Y. 375, 384, 24 N. E. (2d) 87, 91 (1939), the court said the interpretation
of Section 58 has been such as to reject all unincorporated statements and writings "which
the insured may have made or signed without fully understanding their purport or effect".
(Italics inserted).
19. De Lancey v. Rockingham Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 52 N. H. 581, 587 (1873).
In a masterly presentation, the Chief Justice has painted a graphic picture of the conditions
which gave rise to the necessity of legislative intervention. The student of political science
in studying the cause of public antagonism to corporations and "big business" may well con-
sider the early behaviour of the insurance companies.
20. Norristown Title Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 132
Pa. 385, 391, 19 At]. 270, 271 (1890).
21. Lampke v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 279 N. Y. 157, 162, 18 N. E. (2d) 14, 16
(1938); Norristown Title Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
132 Pa. 385, 391, 19 Atl. 270, 271 (1890).
22. Archer v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 218 N. Y. 18, 23, 112 N. E. 433, 435 (1916).
23. Ibid. at 23, 112 N. E. at 435 (1916). See also Bible v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 256 N. Y. 458, 464, 176 N. E. 838, 840 (1931) where Cardozo, C.J. stated that Section
58 required " .. . the whole contract to be stated in the policies, and not ... pieced out by
documents included by mere reference. ... .




Sauce for the Gander
Although the primary purpose in enacting Section 58 was the relief and
protection of the insured rather than the insurer e  and though the courts gave
the statute a broad construction to carry out that purpose,203 situations never-
theless arose where the statute worked a hardship on the insured. One such
instance was the case of Minsker v. John HMcock Mutt. Life Ills. Co.,2 0 where
the insured gave truthful answers concerning his past health to the agent and
medical examiner of the insurer who recorded erroneous answers without the
knowledge of the insured. Pursuant to Section 58, the application containing
the incorrect answers was attached to the policy and thus, by statute, became a
part of the contract. The beneficiary contended that since the agent and
medical examiner of the insurer had full knowledge of the facts (i.e., the past
health of the applicant), the insurer was estopped from invoking the false state-
ments contained in the application as a defence. Prior to 1907, it wras well
settled that if the agent of the insurer was notified of facts which "under the
terms of a policy would make it void if not noted upon it, the company could not
avail itself of the defense that such facts were not stated in the policy, the
underlying principle being that it would be a fraud upon the insured to accept
pay for a policy which the company through its agents knew was void when
delivered." 28  The court in the Minsker case by refusing to give the plaintiff
25. The purpose of Section 58 "was the protection of those insured and of the
beneficiaries claiming under them." Bible v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 256 N. Y.
458, 464, 176 N. E. 833, 840 (1931).
26. Abbott v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 281 N. Y. 375, 384, 24 N. E. (2d) 87,
91 (1939).
27. 254 N. Y. 333, 173 N. E. 4 (1930).
23. Ainsker v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 254 N. Y. 333, 336-337, 173 N. E.
4 (1930) (italics inserted) citing Sternaman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 170 N. Y. 13, 62
N. E. 763 (1902). The Sternaman decision was a leading case on the subject of estoppel
and was frequently cited. There the application stated that the medical examiner was
the agent of the insured and not of the insurance company. The court held the insurer
could not make its agent the agent of the insured and, since the agent had knowledge of the
facts concerning the applicant's health, the insurer could not subsequently interpose those
facts as a defense. "It could not take the money of the in-ured while he lived and, when
he was dead, claim a forfeiture on account of what it knew at the time it made the contract
of insurance, for that would be a fraud." Id. at 23, 62 N. E. 763, at 766. See also Lewis v.
Guardian Fire & Life Assur. Co., 181 N. Y. 392, 295, 74 N. E. 224 (1905); Miller v.
Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 107 N. Y. 292, 296, 14 N. E. 271, 273 (1837). The federal
courts formerly applied the same rule of estoppel to the insurer when its agent at the date of
issuance of the policy had full knowledge of the facts now relied on as a defense [Insurance
Co. v. Wilkinson, 13 Wall. 222 (U. S. 1871)], but the Supreme Court later adopted a
different view and held parol testimony inadmissible to show that the insurer through its
agen, had knowledge of the facts. Northern Assur. Co. v. Grand liew Building Ass'n, 133
U. S. 308 (1901). The latter rule is followed in Massachusetts [Harris v. North American
Ins. Co., 190 Mass. 361, 77 N. E. 493 (1905)] and New Jersey [Dewees v. Manhattan
Ins. Co., 35 N. J. L. 366 (1872)] on the ground that the insured's evidence would violate
the parol evidence rule.
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relief, held the statutory rule (Section 58) superseded the judge-made rule2 9
when a copy of the application was attached to the policy,80 and that the insured
or his beneficiary in such a case could not claim an estoppel against the insurer.
The insured must accept any detriment flowing from the rule, as well as any
benefits. Just as Archer v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc.,31 held the insurer could
not rely on any statement in an application not attached to the policy, the
Minsker case, fourteen years later, held the insured to the same requirements
and stated that since the application was attached to the policy, it was the duty
of the insured to read it and correct any mistakes appearing therein.8 2  While
the latter decision has been criticized as straining "the statute to the breaking
point",33 such criticism apparently overlooks the purpose of the statute which
was to give the insured something he seldom had previously, viz., possession of
all statements which might affect the insurance contract. True, the statute was
enacted for the benefit of the insured but this was so only in the sense of protect-
ing him from statements which did not appear in the contract of insurance and
when those statements were put in his possession he received the full protection
the statute intended to give him. If the insurer is estopped when the application is
not attached, why not hold the insured to the same level of liability when the
application is attached?34 The ruling in the Minsker case, which was unanimous,
has been frequently cited and continues to be the law of New York. The re-
enactment of the Insurance Law and the amendment under consideration do not
affect the decision in any respect.
Briefly, then, as a result of the cases construing Section 58, extraneous state-
29. Sternaman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 170 N. Y. 13, 62 N. E. 763 (1902); see
note 28, supra.
30. After the enactment of Section 58, "the case of Sternaman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
and others to the same effect, ceased to be authority upon the question . . .when a copy
of the application was endorsed upon or attached to the policy . .. " Minsker v. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 254 N. Y. 333, 337, 173 N. E. 4, 5 (1930).
31. 218 N. Y. 18, 112 N. E. 433 (1916).
32. N. Y. L. J., July 26, 1938, p. 224, col. 1, article by Irving Moldauer. "The plaintiff Is
bound by the answers as written, since the application was physically annexed to the policy
of insurance, ..." Minsker v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 254 N. Y. 333, 339, 175
N. E. 4, 5 (1930). The court thus applied general contract law. RESTATZmENT, CONThAcTS
(1932) § 70 provides: "One who makes a written offer which is accepted, or who manifests
acceptance of the terms of a writing which he should reasonably understand to be an offer
or proposed contract, is bound by the contract, though ignorant of the terms of the writing
or of its proper interpretation". The courts, however, by putting insurance contracts in a
class by themselves have hesitated to apply the above principle of contract law to such
contracts. VAwce, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 215.
33. Comment (1931) 29 MicH. L. RE'v. 344, 345. See also (1931) 15 MnN. L. Rv. 595;
(1931) 16 CoRN. L. Q. 235.
34. Bollard v. New York Life Ins. Co., 98 Misc. 286, 294, 162 N. Y. Supp. 706, 710
(Sup. Ct. 1917), aff'd, 168 N. Y. Supp. 1102 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1918), aff'd, 228 N. Y.
521, 126 N. E. 900 (1920). See also Stanulevich v. St. Lawrence Life Ass'n, 228 N. Y.
586, 127 N. E. 315 (1920); Satz v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 243 N. Y. 385, 153
N. E. 844 (1926).
[Vol. 9
LEGISLATION
ments not attached to the policy were not available to the insurer as a defense;
if the statements were attached to the policy they were available as a defense;
but in the absence of fraud, they were deemed representations and not warranties.
On the insured's side of the picture, if the extraneous statements were attached to
the policy, he was bound thereby and could not introduce parol evidence to show
mistake, or knowledge of the true facts by the insurer.
Estoppel Applied to the Insurer
The cases which prepared the foundation for the amendment to Section 142
were those involving waiver or estoppel. As pointed out above, if the applica-
tion was not attached and the insurer knew the true facts, such conduct on the
part of the insurer estopped it from using those facts as a defense. 5 But the
question only arose when the agent had the authority to waive conditions. If
the agent was authorized not only to solicit applications but also to make de-
livery of the policies and collect the premiums, he was held to have apparent
authority to waive conditions and the company was bound by such waiver20
Usually the policy or application contained provisions to the effect that the agent
could not waive any terms or conditions thereof. The next step, therefore,
was to determine whether the applicant had notice of the limitations upon the
agent's authority. True, the policy gave such notice but that was only received
when the policy was delivered and consequently such provision only charged the
insured with notice that the agent could not thereafter waive conditions in the
policyY In other words, to prevent a waiver or estoppel the insurer, before the
contract was made, had to notify the applicant of the agent's limited authority.
If the application was attached to the policy the notice of limitation would be
conclusive and binding upon the insured. That was obvious from the wording of
Section 58. s But if the application containing the notice limiting the agent's
authority was not attached to the policy, could it be used to show receipt of
notice by the insured? Strangely enough, that precise question did not arise
until November, 1939, almost thirty-three years after the statute became
effective, and the answer given to that question was the primary cause for
35. See note 28, supra.
36. McClelland v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 217 N. Y. 336, 111 N. E. 1062 (1916); Bible
v. John Hancock Mlut. Life Ins. Co., 256 N. Y. 458, 176 N E. 838 (1931). For cases holding
that under the facts the agents could not bind the company, see Knobel v. London
Guarantee Accident Co., 181 App. Div. 870, 169 N. 1. Supp. 79 (1st Dep't 1918); Graham
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 176 N. C. 313, 97 S. .E. 6 (1918). See also Brady v Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 581 (Sup. Ct. 1939) to the effect that the power of an agent
to waive provisions of the policy depends upon the rank and status of the agent and the
nature of the matter which he attempts to waive.
37. Bible v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 256 N. Y. 453, 176 N. E. 838 (1931);
Lampke v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 279 N. Y. 157, 18 N. E. (2d) 14 (1938); Abbott
v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 281 N. Y. 375, 24 N. E. (2d) 87 (1939).
38. Bible v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 256 N. Y. 458, 176 N. E. 833 (1831).
This was so although the applicant did not read the application or know of its contents.
Abbott v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 231 N. Y. 375, 380, 24 N. E. (2d) 87, go (1939).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
amending Section 142. That was the case of Abbott v. Prudential Ins. Co.
of America.39
Policies of insurance were issued to an applicant who was a bad risk, and who
died twelve days after the last policy was issued. The agent of the insurer had
full knowledge of the applicant's poor health. Each policy was made subject
to a condition that the insured, at the time of delivery, was in good health.
Further, each policy and application contained a provision that the agent had
no authority to waive any conditions in the policy. The administratrix of the
insured claimed a waiver of the requirement of sound health on the familiar
ground of knowledge by the insurer of the true facts when it issued the policy.
The insurer, to show that notice had been given to the applicant of the limitations
on the agent's authority, introduced in evidence the signed application containing
the notice. Although the application had not been attached to the policy, the
court, in a four to three decision, held it admissible in evidence. The court
pointed out that it concerned a "matter extrinsic to the contract" (i.e. notice to
the insured) and distinguished between offering an unattached application to
show misrepresentations as to health and one to prove notice to the insured of
the limits placed upon the agent's authority to waive a condition. The majority
considered the signed application as an admission that notice had been received,
whereas the minority argued that it amounted to an incorporation into the con-
tract of an extrinsic writing by mere reference, the specific thing Section 58
prohibited.
Present Weight of Abbott Decision
Any discussion as to the relative merits of the two opinions in the Abbott case
would unduly extend this article since the effect of the amendment of Section
142 will be to nullify completely the decision. The Abbott case said an un-
attached application could be used to show notice to the insured. The amend-
ment says an application, a copy of which is not attached, can not be used
at all. This is the practical effect of the amendment since it provides that no
application "shall be admissible in evidence" unless a true copy was attached
to the policy when issued. Therefore, under this amendment the Abbott case
would be decided differently because the application, no copy of which was
attached to the policy, could not be introduced- in evidence to show notice
to the insured of the limitations upon the agent's authority. Since, as the entire
court in the Abbott case agreed, proof of notice to the insured of the limitations
on the agent's authority can be shown by any statement, oral or written, of the
insured admitting the receipt of such notice, the wisdom of the legislature in
removing from the insurer the use of the signed application to show such notice
may appear to be carrrying to an extreme the policy of "protecting the in-
sured." However, if one bears in mind the conditions that brought about the
enactment of Section 58, the amendment can easily be justified. Although
39. 281 N. Y. 375, 24 N. E. (2d) 87 (1939). For a critical view of the decision, see
(1940) 40 CoL. L. REv. 333. For interpretations of somewhat similar statutes in other
jurisdictions, see New York Life Ins. Co. v. Fukushima, 74 Colo. 236, 220 P. 994 (1923);
Olsson v. Midland Ins. Co., 138 Minn. 424, 165 N. W. 474 (1917).
[Vol. 9
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insurers have undoubtedly improved their original tactics, human nature has not
altered; the insured seldom reads the application before or after signing.'0 It
was this failure of the applicant to read his application, together with other
circumstances, that lead to the passage of Section 58. There is no more reason
to believe that the applicant reads and understands his application today than
there was in 1906. Despite the apparent futility of getting the insured to read
his application it is, nevertheless, proper to require the insurer to attach a copy
thereof to the policy. Of course it may well be argued that the legislature should
not be asked to cover up the shortcomings of the applicant for insurance. Such
a contention is weighty but the legislature undoubtedly took a practical view of
the subject and treated applicants for insurance "as they are and not as they
should be". The amendment does not encourage laxity; it merely recognizes
facts as they exist. And for this the applicants alone are not to blame; the
insurers must also shoulder the responsibility for the situation since they have
complete control over the selection of their agents who are sent out in the field
"to sell" insurance and it is to be doubted that such agents are completely allergic
to the use of "high pressure salesmanship". In short, it is better that our
representatives legislate for insurance applicants as they actually behave and
not as they would behave in an insurance Utopia where all would read and
understand their applications.
Applications for Reinstatement
The legislature, therefore, is to be commended as far as it has gone. The
only regret is that it did not go far enough. The amendment is confined solely
to applications for the issuance of a policy. It would have been more desirable
if it extended to all applications so as to include applications for the rcinstate-
ment of a lapsed policy. Since Section 58 said, "Every policy of insurance
issued... ", it was naturally held to be applicable oaiy to applications for the
issuance of a policy and not to applications for the reinstatement of a lapsed
policy,41 because the reinstatement of a policy is simply a contract for the
continuation in force of a former policy and is not the issuance of a new policy.42
Hence if the insurer sought to cancel the reinstatement of a policy on the grounds
of misrepresentation of material facts made in the application for reinstatement,
it was no defense that the application was not attached.4 3 If Section 58 did not
40. As late as 1930, Professor Vance wrote: "it is only rarely that even careful business
men do in fact read insurance policies delivered to them". VAucr, Irusuacn (2d ed.
1930) 215.
41. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Rosen, 227 App. Div. 79, 236 N. Y. Supp. 6S9 (Ist
Dep't 1929).
42. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Dreeben, 20 F. (2d) 394 (K. D. Tex. 1927). See alzo
Reidy v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 245 Mass. 373, 376, 139 N E. 538, 539 (1923)
where the court said the applications for the reinstatement of the policy were not ap-
plications for a new contract of insurance but rather applications for the revsal of a
contract of insurance. For a similar interpretation, see Linder v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 148 Tenn. 236, 255 S. W. 43 (1923).




apply to applications for reinstatement, then it might be supposed that the
insured could interpose the common law rule of estoppel which existed prior to
Section 58.44 However in Axelroad v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.45 the Court
of Appeals held the theory of estoppel did not apply to the reinstatement of a
policy even though the proof was offered on the same theory on which similar
proof was offered prior to Section 58, viz., "the knowledge of the agent was the
knowledge of the insurer." As a result of that decision the insurer can avoid
payment on a reinstated policy by showing a material misrepresentation in the
application for reinstatement but the insured can not claim he gave truthful
answers to the agent who erroneously recorded them in the unattached applica-
tion. 46 The'Axelroad case has created a situation which harkens back to the
days of Chief Justice Doe. Paradoxically enough, the same court which nurtured
the rule of estoppel in the issuance of a policy and gave protection to the insured
long before Section 58 was adopted, now turns a deaf ear to the plaint of the
insured that it was the agent who deluded the insurer when the application for
reinstatement was filled out. Here is fertile ground for legislative action to pro-
tect the insured. If the application for the issuance of a policy is seldom read,
what facts exist for believing the insured acts differently when he applies to have
his policy reinstated? Why should the fact that his initial policy has lapsed
indicate that he has become a stickler for reading later insurance applications?
But most important, even if he did read his application he is still unprotected
because he continues to be bound by any false answer inserted in the application
by the agent. Probably the first inkling which he has that the agent acted wrong-
fully is when the insurer seeks to cancel the reinstated policy. That condition
could be alleviated somewhat by requiring the insurer to attach a copy of the
application for reinstatement to the policy.47 In this connection it may be noted
that on the re-codification of the Insurance Law, Section 142 was enlarged to
provide that if a copy of the application for reinstatement is not delivered to
the insured upon his request, the insurer can not introduce such application in
evidence in any action based upon the policy.48 If the insured does not request a
copy, will such application still be admissible? As between the Axelroad case
(which admitted the application) and the provision in Section 142 expressly
denying its use in a particular situation, the better view seems to be that it will
still be admitted. Though this requirement of Section 142 is a step in the right
direction, it is not entirely satisfactory. If applications and policies are seldom
read, it is rather unlikely that an insured will go to the additional trouble of
requesting a copy of his application for reinstatement.
44. See note 28, supra.
45. 267 N. Y. 437, 196 N. E. 388 (1935). There the insurer pleaded that the application
for reinstatement contained misrepresentations in regard to material matters, though the
agent of the insurer was the one who inserted such false answers without the knowledge of
the insured.
46. Axelroad v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 267 N. Y. 437, 196 N. E. 388 (1935).
47. See N. Y. L. J., February 27, 1940, p 890, col. 3, letter by Irving Moldauer, and
N. Y. L. J., July 26, 1938, p. 224, col. 1, and N. Y. L. J., July 27, 1938, p. 234, col. 1, con-
taining articles contributed by Irving Moldauer.




That the legislature is not entirely satisfied with the re-codification of the
Insurance Law is evidenced by the many amendments that have been made
since the beginning of the current year.A0 It is desirable, therefore, that the
legislature take the same practical view of the situation which it exhibited when
it enacted the present amendment, by further amending Section 142 to require a
copy of the application for the reinstatement to be attached or indored upon
the policy in order that such application be admisible in evidence.
49. According to a survey made by the Insurance Federation of the State of Ne., Yorh,
of the 3,600 bills introduced up to about the middle of March, 403 measures had either
directly or indirectly affected the business of insurance. N. Y. Herald Tribune, March 17,
1940, sec. TT, p. 15, col. 6.
